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The exchange rate debate
According to conventional wisdom, the exchange rate
policy of the so-called Asian51—which can be described
as an implicit dollar peg—contributed to the 1997 finan-
cial crisis in two distinct ways.
One, a major realignment of the value of international
currencies, particularly the appreciation of the US dollar
against the Japanese yen, contributed to an appreciation
of real effective exchange rates in these countries. This
led to a bias towards the nontradable sector (e.g., real
estate) at the expense of the tradable sector (e.g., ex-
ports). The real appreciation could have been avoided if
the exchange rates against the dollar were depreciated.
Instead, though, the monetary authorities held on to their
respective pegs and as a result, exporters were hurt, im-
port-substituting industries became less competitive, and
investments in the real estate sector increased sharply.
Two, the implicit guarantee that the exchange rates
will remain fixed led creditors and borrowers to ignore for-
eign exchange risk. This outlook, combined with a sub-
stantially liberalized capital account, enticed volatile and
potentially destabilizing short-run capital flows to the re-
gion and unhedged foreign borrowing by domestic borrow-
ers. The argument, of course, is that a more flexible ex-
change rate would have made borrowers more prudent
since chances of a depreciation would have been greater.
Corollary to this, when downward pressure was ex-
erted on the exchange rates in the region, adjustment to
the implicit peg was strongly resisted primarily because of
the potentially large increase in the burden of foreign-
currency denominated debt. The resistance proved futile
and only served to exacerbate the economic costs mainly
in terms of a rise in interest rates and unnecessary losses
in foreign exchange reserves.
The East Asian debacle has sparked a vigorous de-
bate on the appropriate exchange rate regime that an
economy must adopt. One critical issue is the credibility of2 March 2001
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the regime. Changing conditions like the appreciation of
the yen may lead to a misalignment of the exchange rate
and if economic agents anticipate the inability of the mon-
etary authority to defend the current parity, a great deal of
pressure will be put on the exchange rate. Speculation
against the exchange rate may also be brought about by
shifts in investor sentiment leading to the possibility of
self-fulfilling expectations. The mere suspicion that an ex-
change rate is unsustainable would lead investors to pull
out their capital, which would then lead to an actual cur-
rency depreciation.
Rumors, runs and panics among foreign investors
are actually more likely in a world of greater capital mobility
and poorly informed market participants. The solution is
to adopt a very transparent and credible policy stance which
can be facilitated by either one of the extreme exchange
rate regimes: a very hard peg or a free float. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) has recommended a free float
or what they term as a loosely managed float for most
emerging market economies. On the other hand, Profes-
sor Guillermo Calvo of the University of Maryland has ad-
vocated for dollarization.
Dollarization as an option for an exchange rate
regime
The main reason for adopting a free float is that most
emerging market economies do not have the institutional
capacity and economic structure to implement a currency
board. The latter is one form of a very hard peg. Under a
currency board system, there is no independent monetary
policy. The latter is calibrated to defend the existing peg
and cannot be used to influence economic activity. Capital
and labor mobility and wage and price flexibility are neces-
sary ingredients for a currency board system to work. This
is because the exchange rate cannot adjust to economic
shocks. Hence, disturbances in the economy are absorbed
through wage adjustments and/or changes in the level of
employment.
Since most emerging market economies do not pos-
sess these attributes, the natural recourse is to adopt a
free float. However, this option usually ignores the phe-
nomenon of liability dollarization, i.e., the fact that most of
the debt of the government and private agents are de-
nominated in a foreign currency. Since revenues of these
private agents are in local currency, any sharp currency de-
preciations would adversely affect their balance sheets,
particularly those of banks and corporations. Moreover,
greater exchange rate volatility usually leads to higher in-
flation, lower investment and lower exports.
In this context, Professor Calvo has recommended
dollarization as the more appropriate exchange rate regime.
Full or official dollarization means adopting a foreign cur-
rency (usually the US dollar, hence the term) as a unit of
account, medium of exchange and store of value. Further-
more, foreign currency has exclusive or predominant sta-
tus as full legal tender. And while domestic currency may
still exist— as it does in Panama—it is confined to a very
minor role, usually in terms of just coins that are used for
small change. The less extreme case is partial dollarization,
which usually corresponds to asset substitution, i.e., resi-
dents are allowed to hold financial assets denominated in
a foreign currency.
Based on the above, the immediate advantage of
dollarization is that the problem of a currency mismatch
will be avoided. Assets and liabilities will be denominated
in a single currency. Moreover, there will be no destabiliz-
ing speculative attacks on the currency since there will be
no exchange rate to speak of. There are, of course, also
costs involved. The next section looks at these as well as
the benefits in more detail.
"Full or official dollarization means adopting
a foreign currency as a unit of account,
medium of exchange and store of value.
Furthermore, foreign currency has exclusive
or predominant status as full legal tender.
And while domestic currency may still exist—
as it does in Panama—it is confined to a very
minor role..."3 No. 2001-02
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Costs and benefits of
dollarization
The primary cost of
dollarization is the loss of
seigniorage on the part of the
monetary authority. Seignior-
age is the revenue from is-
suing currency. It is some-
times referred to—albeit mis-
takenly—as the inflation tax.
Benefits from seigniorage can be measured in both stock
and flow terms. The latter stems from the foregone inter-
est on international reserves that are used to purchase
the stock of domestic currency held by the public. On the
other hand, stock costs refer to the foregone future earn-
ings that result from the flow of new currency that are printed
every year to satisfy the increase in the demand for money.
The seigniorage arises from the difference between the
cost of producing and distributing paper money and coins
and their purchasing power.
Some estimates show that the costs related to the
loss of seigniorage can be significant. For an average coun-
try, the stock cost could be as much as 4-5 percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP). Meanwhile, the flow cost
has been estimated at 0.2 percent of GDP for Argentina.
The present value would be about 20 percent of GDP. One
way to reduce the costs related to losing seigniorage would
be for the dollarizing economy to enter into a treaty with
the U.S. to share its revenues from seigniorage specific to
that economy. A bill has been proposed in the US Con-
gress entitled the “International Monetary Stability Act”
which allows the US Secretary of the Treasury to certify
officially dollarized countries as eligible to receive rebates
of seigniorage from the U.S.
Another critical consideration would be the cost of
losing flexibility in monetary and exchange rate policy. A
fully dollarized economy has no choice but to adopt the
monetary policy of the issuing country. This has led to what
is called asymmetric shocks. One could consider a shock
a situation that requires lower interest rates or a deprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate in the dollarized economy
but that has no effect on the U.S. Under these conditions,
the US monetary policy will not change and thus, the
dollarized economy may have to undergo a recession in
response to the shock.
The third potential cost would be losing the domes-
tic central bank as lender of last resort. This implies that
there will be no entity that could bail out a domestic bank
in case it experiences a run. It should be noted that the
aforementioned International Monetary Stability Act explic-
itly states that the U.S. would not be obligated to act as a
lender of last resort. One solution is to arrange for lines of
credit from foreign banks. Branches of foreign banks can
also provide credit directly to domestic banks without gov-
ernment involvement. Another alternative is for the central
bank to accumulate foreign exchange reserves and along
with the treasury, establish a stabilization fund which can
be used to counter bank runs.
There is also the one-time cost of converting prices,
computer programs, cash registers and vending machines
from domestic currency to foreign currency. This is akin to
menu costs. Finally, countries may be reluctant to aban-
don their own currencies because the domestic currency
also acts as a national symbol.
Many of the abovementioned costs could be out-
weighed by benefits that are derived from the same fac-
tors. By adopting the monetary policy of the U.S., dollarized
economies will experience lower interest rates and lower
inflation. This will increase investment spending and spur
economic growth. In addition, the absence of an exchange
rate that has to be defended eliminates balance-of-
"A critical consideration would be the cost of losing flexibility in
monetary and exchange rate policy. A fully dollarized economy has
no choice but to adopt the monetary policy of the issuing country.
This has led to what is called asymmetric shocks...a situation that
requires lower interest rates or a depreciation of the real exchange
rate in the dollarized economy but that has no effect on the U.S."4 March 2001
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payment (BOP) crises and the rationale for exchange
controls. Another way of looking at it is that the
monetary authority will not have to be concerned
about credibility problems with its exchange rate
policy.
Meanwhile, by eliminating the government’s
power to spur inflation, dollarization fosters the
government’s budgetary discipline. While this will
not eliminate budget deficits, the latter will be fi-
nanced through fairly transparent methods of higher
taxes or more government debt. The rather risky
option of printing money cannot be considered.
Finally, dollarization will lower transaction
costs in international trade. This stems partly from
the difference between the buying and selling rates
for converting domestic currency to foreign currency.
Hedging for currency risk will also become unnec-
essary.
Dollarization in the Philippines
The extent of dollarization is usually measured by
the ratio of foreign currency deposits (FCDs) held by resi-
dents to a broad money aggregate. Using the IMF stan-
dard, an economy is considered highly dollarized if the ra-
tio is greater than 30 percent. Otherwise, it is moderately
dollarized. Theoretically, all assets must be considered in
the measure, including foreign currency circulating as cash
in the domestic economy and cross-border deposits. How-
ever, because of data considerations, the analysis is lim-
ited only to FCDs.
Table 1 shows that the ratio of FCDs to M3 (FCD/
M3) for the Philippines increased from 11.8 percent in
1986 to 40.7 percent as of June 2000. However, if this
ratio is corrected for exchange rate changes (FCD$/M3),
then the increase is less pronounced. Meanwhile, the ra-
tio of FCDs to M4, which is comparable to the IMF figures
in Table 1, increased from 10.5 to 28.9 percent in the
same period. As such, the Philippines is nearing the thresh-
old for a highly dollarized economy.
The major reason for the increasing trend in
dollarization is the rise in remittances from overseas work-
ers and export receipts. From only $546 million in 1981,
remittances from overseas workers increased to $6.8 bil-
lion in 1999 while exports rose from $5.7 billion to $35.2
billion in the same period (Table 2). Institutional factors
also played a key role. The liberalization of regulations gov-
erning foreign exchange transactions in 1992 facilitated
the return of foreign-based funds that had earlier left as
capital flight. The new rules also allowed exporters to re-
tain 100 percent of their receipts. Capital account liberal-
ization also sparked the surge of portfolio investment to
the Philippines as seen in Table 2. These developments
were reflected in the FCD ratio to broad money, which
reached a pre-1996 peak in 1993.
Meanwhile, the uniform currency act was repealed in
June 1996. While the peso is recognized as the only legal
tender, parties may agree that the obligation or transac-
tion will be settled in any other currency at the time of
payment. Hence, foreign currency is de facto legal tender
Year FCD FCD/M3 FCD$/M3 FCD/M4 Ratio Reported
  (Bill P) by IMF
           
  1986 17.01 11.8 0.58 10.5 -
1987 20.54 12.7 0.61 11.3 -
1988 28.49 15.1 0.71 13.1 -
1989 42.70 16.8 0.76 14.4 -
1990 64.74 21.5 0.77 17.7 17.4
1991 79.02 22.8 0.85 18.5 18.0
1992 104.25 27.1 1.07 21.3 21.0
1993 147.25 30.7 1.10 23.5 22.6
1994 167.08 27.5 1.14 21.5 20.9
1995 216.30 28.4 1.08 22.1 21.5
1996 331.75 37.6 1.43 27.3 -
1997 426.91 40.0 1.07 28.6 -
1998 471.16 41.1 1.03 29.2 -
1999 506.12 37.1 0.91 27.0 -
2000* 533.27 40.7 0.96 28.9 -
           
*June.
Data refer to end year.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, 1999. Monetary policy in dollarized
economies. Occasional Paper 171.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Table 1. Ratio of FCDs to broad money aggregates5 No. 2001-02
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in the Philippines. An interesting point is that there is no
legal impediment for the Philippines to become a semioffi-
cial dollarized economy.
A sharp increase in the FCD-broad money ratio was
recorded in 1996 and this has been sustained until June
2000 as earlier shown in Table 1. While exchange rate
movements can explain the behavior of the ratio for the
period 1997-2000 (as seen from the FCD$/M3 ratio), the
reasons for the jump in 1996 are not straightforward. One
possible factor is the surge in foreign exchange liabilities
of the commercial banks in 1996 as seen in Table 2. Com-
mercial banks took advantage of the arbitrage opportunity
provided by the difference between international interest
rates and domestic interest rates. This led to a sharp in-
crease in what is called liability dollarization. However, by
borrowing in foreign currency and lending to domestic bor-
rowers, who were unhedged against exchange risk, com-
mercial banks created one side of the double-mismatch
problem. The other side was mismatch in maturity which
was exacerbated by the fact that most of the foreign bor-
rowing was short-term in nature.
Dollarization and the conduct of monetary policy
Dollarization will affect the choice of monetary tar-
get, the implementation of monetary policy and the struc-
ture of prudential supervision. Currency substitution im-
plies that dollar monetary assets should be part of the
relevant concept of money when targeting the price level.
On the other hand, asset substitution does not affect the
transaction demand for money and hence implies that FCDs
should not be included in the relevant monetary aggre-
gate. In practice, the choice of the more relevant monetary
target is an empirical issue.
Heavily dollarized economies should consider the use
of dollar-denominated instruments in affecting monetary
conditions. However, the effectiveness of the instrument
will be affected by the degree of substitutability between
dollar-denominated government bonds and dollar assets
available outside the home country. The higher the degree
of substitutability is, the lower the effectiveness of the
instrument is.
Meanwhile, foreign currency reserve requirements can
play a useful role as automatic liquidity stabilizers in heavily
dollarized economies. Reserve requirements on FCDs can
also be used to auto-
matically sterilize or dis-
courage capital inflows.
Because the Philippines
is not yet heavily
dollarized, reserve re-
quirements have not yet
been imposed on FCDs.
However, banks are re-
quired to provide 100
percent cover.
The 1997 financial
crisis exposed the risks
of liability dollarization.
While the management




Year Overseas Filipino Foreign Direct Commercial Banks' Portfolio Exports
Workers’ Remittances Investments Foreign Liabilities Investment (nominal)
     
1981 545.87 175 4410 3 5722
1985 687.20 17 2953 5 4629
1990 1181.07 528 2324 152 8186
1991 1500.29 529 2140 212 8840
1992 2221.80 675 1911 451 9824
1993 2276.40 864 1115 955 11375
1994 3008.10 1289 2172 1641 13483
1995 3868.40 1361 2975 1997 17447
1996 4306.50 1338 7217 2179 20543
1997 5741.80 1113 8165  -351 25228
1998 4926.00 1592 7778 80 29496
1999 6794.60 864 6899 347 35260.6
           
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Table 2. Sources of foreign currency
(In US$million)6 March 2001
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tial regulation and supervision need to account for the vul-
nerability imparted to bank balance sheets. Hence, there
is need to monitor the compliance with the 1988 Basel
Capital Accord.2 Moreover, limits on foreign exchange po-
sitions—following international standards—should be
strictly enforced to contain foreign exchange risk. Impos-
ing restrictions on foreign currency loans is another op-
tion.
Concluding remarks
Since the Philippines is not yet a heavily dollarized
economy, the issue of full dollarization is not relevant as of
this time. Nevertheless, the presence of foreign currency
deposits does affect the efficacy of monetary and exchange
rate policy. This may partially explain why the inflationary
effects of a currency depreciation have been muted, as
compared to 1983 and also why the hike in interest rates
in October 2000 hardly made a dent on the rate of the
peso’s depreciation.
A recommendation for the choice of an exchange rate
regime is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it can
be stated that even if the Philippines becomes heavily
dollarized, full dollarization—in the context of using the US
dollar—may not be an optimal strategy. Aside from the
costs mentioned earlier, the Philippines has a large vol-
ume of trade with Japan. The volatility of the yen-dollar
exchange rate should be reason enough for countries of
East Asia—which are considered to be part of a yen bloc—
to be cautious about moves toward dollarization.  4 4
__________
2The recommended capital adequacy ratio for commercial banks is
8 percent. Since 1988, this has been progressively adopted not only by
member countries of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) but also by other countries with
active international banks. The Committee is in the process of amending
the 1988 Accord taking into account new developments in the interna-
tional financial system.
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